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Data sharingObjectives: It has become regular practice to de-identify unstructured medical text for use in research
using automatic methods, the goal of which is to remove patient identifying information to minimize
re-identification risk. The metrics commonly used to determine if these systems are performing well
do not accurately reflect the risk of a patient being re-identified. We therefore developed a framework
for measuring the risk of re-identification associated with textual data releases.
Methods: We apply the proposed evaluation framework to a data set from the University of Michigan
Medical School. Our risk assessment results are then compared with those that would be obtained using
a typical contemporary micro-average evaluation of recall in order to illustrate the difference between
the proposed evaluation framework and the current baseline method.
Results: We demonstrate how this framework compares against common measures of the
re-identification risk associated with an automated text de-identification process. For the probability
of re-identification using our evaluation framework we obtained a mean value for direct identifiers of
0.0074 and a mean value for quasi-identifiers of 0.0022. The 95% confidence interval for these estimates
were below the relevant thresholds. The threshold for direct identifier risk was based on previously used
approaches in the literature. The threshold for quasi-identifiers was determined based on the context of
the data release following commonly used de-identification criteria for structured data.
Discussion: Our framework attempts to correct for poorly distributed evaluation corpora, accounts for the
data release context, and avoids the often optimistic assumptions that are made using the more
traditional evaluation approach. It therefore provides a more realistic estimate of the true probability
of re-identification.
Conclusions: This framework should be used as a basis for computing re-identification risk in order to
more realistically evaluate future text de-identification tools.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There has been significant research on developing tools for the
de-identification of free-form medical text [1,2]. The evaluation
methods currently used to determine whether these tools are
performing well enough are borrowed from the areas of entity
extraction and information retrieval [3]. There has been somerecognition that these evaluation approaches are not always
the most appropriate for measuring the probability of
re-identification nor are the benchmarks typically used to decide
what is ‘‘good enough” directly relevant to the de-identification
task [4]. Such concerns triggered the current work.
In this paper we critically examine the methods that are cur-
rently used to evaluate medical text de-identification tools [1,2],
identify their weaknesses, and propose improvements. We then
propose a unified framework for evaluation in terms of the proba-
bility of re-identification when medical text is de-identified using
automated tools. Our framework builds on existing work, and its
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the disclosure control literature, the information retrieval litera-
ture, and the risk modeling literature to provide a more detailed
evaluation scheme for measuring re-identification risk.
The issues we identify in current evaluation methods can in
some instances inflate the performance of de-identification tools
by making them look better than they really are, and in other
instances may also penalize them by making them seem much
worse than they really are. This means that our proposed evalua-
tion framework will not consistently give higher risk values or
lower risk values than currently used methods, although we argue
that it represents a more accurate modeling of the probability of
re-identification because it better accounts for the distribution of
identifiers in documents. We illustrate the differences between
our framework and conventional evaluation approaches using the-
oretical and empirical examples. We then illustrate the application
of this framework on a clinical data set, and compare the findings
to what would be obtained using current evaluation methods.2. Background
2.1. Evaluation approaches used in text de-identification
Most of the current text de-identification systems treat Personal
Health Information (PHI) identification as a named entity recogni-
tion problem. Consequently, they evaluate the identification per-
formance with metrics used in the named entity recognition and
information retrieval literature [3]. In particular, they typically
annotate different types of entities (or categories), such as date,
patient name, and ID, and report performance primarily using three
metrics: precision, recall, and f-measure. Let tp be the number of
true positive annotations, fp be the number of false positive anno-
tations, and fn be the number of false negative annotations. Then,
recall r is given by
r ¼ tp=ðtpþ fnÞ; ð1Þ
and precision p is given by
p ¼ tp=ðtpþ fpÞ: ð2Þ
Recall and precision answer two questions about a de-
identification tool, respectively: ‘‘Did we find all that we were
looking for?” and ‘‘Did we only label what we were looking for?”
The metric f-measure combines precision and recall, typically by
taking the harmonic mean of the two. To get a sense of the overall
performance of a system, the most commonly used metrics are
micro-average and macro-average precision, recall, and f-measure.
To compute micro-average, one creates a confusion matrix for all
categories and then computes precision and recall from this table,
giving equal weight to each PHI instance irrespective of its cate-
gory. To compute macro-average, one computes precision and
recall for each category separately and then averages them over
all categories, giving equal weight to each category, to get an over-
all measure of performance.
In Appendix A we summarize evaluation metrics currently used
in the text de-identification literature. This review indicates that
micro-average recall is a primary metric for evaluating such tools.
We also conclude that the number of clinical notes (i.e., number of
patients) used in different studies range from 100 to 7193, and that
the number of test documents used in different studies range from
220 to 514.
In the context of text de-identification, current evaluation
approaches are limited in three ways. First, they report perfor-
mance on all instances of an entity across all documents. However,
none of them consider the number of PHI elements missed within a
document, which is an important aspect in de-identification, as adocument typically corresponds to a patient and any leaks within
a document mean potentially revealing the identity of that patient.
In other words, current evaluation approaches do not truly reflect
the risk of a patient being re-identified. Second, they evaluate all
types of entities with the same evaluation metric, giving equal
weight to each entity type even though directly identifying enti-
ties, such as name and address, have a higher risk of re-
identification compared to indirectly identifying entities, such as
age and race. Finally, they do not account for the distribution of
PHI across documents. For example, an entity type that is rare
and appears in very few documents will have a higher sensitivity
to the performance of an information extraction tool than a more
prevalent entity type. We examine each of these issues below.
2.2. Basic concepts
The key assumptions that we make in developing our evalua-
tion framework are detailed below. Some of these assumptions
are already made in the literature implicitly, but it is important
in our context to make them explicit.
2.2.1. One document = one patient
We assume that every document that is being analyzed pertains
to an individual patient (i.e., there is a one-to-one mapping
between documents and patients). This means that if a document
pertains to multiple patients then that information is split into
multiple documents. This assumption simplifies the presentation
of our framework and its rationale.
In the case where a simple split is not possible, as in the case of
clinical study reports from clinical trials, then we assume that all of
the information pertaining to an individual trial participant can be
extracted as a unit and treated as a separate virtual document for
the purposes of evaluation.
This assumption also means that each patient only has one doc-
ument in the corpus. For example, if the evaluation corpus consists
of hospital discharge records, then each patient has a single dis-
charge record.
2.2.2. Information leak = re-identification
Furthermore, we assume that if an annotation is not detected
(i.e., ‘‘leaked”) then it can be used to re-identify a patient. So the
probability of re-identifying a patient is conditional on a leak
occurring. We have:
Prðreid; leakÞ ¼ PrðreidjleakÞ  PrðleakÞ ð3Þ
The probability of a leak in a set of documents is directly related
to recall, r, given by:
PrðleakÞ ¼ 1 r ð4Þ
Based on our assumptions we can then say:
PrðreidjleakÞ ¼ 1 ð5Þ
We will examine further below how much information needs to
be leaked to re-identify a patient. This simplifying assumption is
conservative in that it will inflate the risk of re-identification.
2.2.3. Re-identification from correct information extraction
A corollary to the assumption above is that if an annotation is
detected, or ‘‘caught”, then it is either redacted or re-synthesized,
such that the probability of re-identifying a patient from that infor-
mation is zero.
We can formulate this probability as:
Prðreid; catchÞ ¼ PrðreidjcatchÞ  PrðcatchÞ ð6Þ
where PrðcatchÞ ¼ 1 PrðleakÞ, which is recall. Clearly the annota-
tions that were leaked versus those that were caught are mutually
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given by Prðreid; catchÞ þ Prðreid; leakÞ, or:
½PrðreidjcatchÞ  ½1 PrðleakÞ þ ½PrðreidjleakÞ  PrðleakÞ ð7Þ
Which, given the assumption that PrðreidjleakÞ ¼ 1 in equation (5),
simplifies to:
PrðreidjcatchÞ þ ½PrðleakÞ  ð1 PrðreidjcatchÞÞ ð8Þ
The above equation represents the overall probability of re-
identification from annotations that were detected during infor-
mation extraction and modified, and those that were leaked. For
now, we will assume that PrðreidjcatchÞ ¼ 0, which will be valid
in most cases where redaction or re-synthesis are used. For specific
contexts in which generalization or other transformations are per-
formed on the detected identifiers, such as for documents shared in
the context of clinical trials transparency efforts, we drop this
assumption and allow PrðreidjcatchÞ > 0. The relaxation of this
assumption is discussed further in Appendix B.
2.2.4. Distinction between direct and indirect identifiers
As is commonly done in the disclosure control literature [5–7],
we consider two types of PHI annotations in text: direct identifiers
and quasi-identifiers. Direct identifiers are annotations such as first
name, last name, telephone numbers, unique identifiers (for exam-
ple, medical record numbers (MRNs) and social security numbers
(SSNs)), and email addresses. Quasi-identifiers are annotations that
can indirectly identify the patients, such as dates, ZIP codes, city,
state, and facility names. Direct and quasi-identifiers are the types
of features in health information that are typically targeted during
the de-identification of health data [8]. In our analysis we will
make a distinction between these two types of annotations
because the manner in which they need to be evaluated will differ.
2.2.5. Focus on micro-average recall
Given that our focus is mostly on a unified framework for mea-
suring re-identification risk, recall is most relevant. This does not
mean that precision is not important as a metric to evaluate the
performance of de-identification tools: only that in the context of
the current paper it will not be the focus of our analysis.
Since we do not consider precision further in this paper, we also
do not consider the f-measure since it combines recall and preci-
sion. We can also see in the literature review in Appendix A that
the most commonly used metric for evaluating the risk of re-
identification is micro-average recall. Micro-average recall is there-
fore used as the baseline measure of re-identification risk.
2.3. Critical appraisal of performance evaluation methods
We now consider the weaknesses in conventional approaches
to performance evaluation and address these weaknesses. To illus-
trate some of these points, we use the 2006 i2b2 de-identification
challenge data set [2]. The data from this challenge has become a
standard for text de-identification evaluation.1 The data has been
manually de-identified ‘‘for the challenge by replacing authentic
PHI with synthesized surrogates”, however the surrogate PHI is not
realistic. For our purposes, we used a rule-based de-identification
tool described in [9] for our illustrations below.
2.3.1. All-or-nothing recall
Imagine there is an evaluation set of 100 clinical documents,
and these documents have 250 different instances of the last name
of a patient. Then micro-average recall would be computed across
all of these 250 instances. If 230 of the instances were detected by1 https://www.i2b2.org/NLP/DataSets/Main.php – Last accessed on March 31, 2016.the de-identification tool then the recall would be 0.92 (i.e.,
230/250).
The micro-average does not account for the fact that there were
100 documents, and it does not account for how these names were
distributed across these documents. This is important because for
direct identifiers, the general assumption is that a single instance
of a direct identifier is sufficient to determine the identity of the
patient. Although one can come up with counter-examples to this
assumption (for example, the name ‘‘James” would not directly
identify a unique patient because it is so common), it is one
assumption commonly made in the disclosure control community
and errs on the conservative side. The implication of this assump-
tion is that we will be conservative because any single leaked
direct identifier is equated with a successful re-identification. If
the true re-identification can only happen if two direct identifiers
leak then we would be being overly protective.
If a single instance of a direct identifier in a document can
reveal the identity of the patient, then all that is needed to reveal
the identity of a patient is for a single direct identifier to leak (or
not to be detected) in a document. If a document has 10 instances
of a patient’s last name and 9 of those instances are detected, from
a re-identification risk perspective this is not a 90% recall but a 0%
recall because there was at least one leak. This is the all-or-nothing
recall.
To continue with our example, if the 230 names that were cor-
rectly detected were all the names in 80 documents, and the
remaining 20 names that were not detected were in the other 20
documents (i.e., one name in each document), then the probability
of determining the identity of the patient in these 20 documents is
almost certain. The micro-average recall of 0.92 inflates the perfor-
mance of the de-identification tool. The all-or-nothing recall in this
case is 0.8, and the correct probability of re-identifying an individ-
ual in these documents is then 0.2 instead of 0.08.
Therefore, for direct identifiers it is important to use the all-or-
nothing recall value rather than the micro-average recall value [9].
Consider Table 1, which illustrates the magnitude of the differ-
ences between micro-average recall and all-or-nothing recall on
the i2b2 data set. The ‘‘DI” group contains all annotation types that
would be classified as direct identifiers. Notice how the micro-
average recall remains fairly constant when including many PHI
types, while the all-or-nothing recall drops markedly. Adding more
annotation types can only add more opportunities to leak values,
which leads to monotonically decreasing all-or-nothing recall.
However, micro-average, by definition of an average, need not
decrease; adding an annotation type with a high recall could
increase average, even though the documents previously contain-
ing leaks still contain leaks. Micro-average can be extremely mis-
leading about the rate of re-identification for leaked direct
identifiers.
2.3.2. Masking recall
During information extraction a particular type of annotation is
detected. For example, if there is a ‘‘James” in the document then it
is identified and then classified as a ‘‘First Name”. If both of these
steps (identification and classification) are true, then this is typi-
cally considered a true positive. However, from a de-
identification/recall perspective it does not matter whether
‘‘James” is classified as a first name or a last name. All that matters
is that it has been detected. Of course the classification as a ‘‘First
Name” may matter from a precision perspective, but it does not
matter from a recall perspective.
Consider Table 2 where the annotation provided manually by
an expert does not match what a de-identification tool could deter-
mine. However, in a redacted document the net effect is the same –
the name of the facility will be protected. All the identifying infor-
mation is removed. Therefore, a more precise recall would consider
Table 2
Example of a mismatch between expert annotation and the classification by a de-
identification tool.
Expert annotation [ORG]Thompson’s Ohio Children’s Hospital[/ORG]
De-identification tool [NAME]Thompson’s[/NAME] [STATE]Ohio[/STATE]
[ORG]Children’s Hospital[/ORG]
Table 1
Comparison of micro-average recall and all-or-nothing recall on i2b2 data.
ID Names DI
Micro-average recall 0.8396 0.7909 0.8049
All-or-nothing recall 0.5997 0.3618 0.1863
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several annotations of different types.
Therefore, we define masking recall as the recall value calcu-
lated only based on whether a particular direct or quasi-
identifier in the text has been detected or not [4] (also called
PHI-level evaluation in [10]). Masking recall should use a token
level evaluation: evaluate that each token is masked.
Consider Table 3, which shows the comparison of masking
recall and conventional recall for different annotation types in
the i2b2 data set. For all annotation types, masking recall is mark-
edly higher than the conventional recall. The crucial question from
the de-identification perspective is whether we missed a PHI or
not. The masking recall more clearly answers this question, as it
indicates the extent to which instances of an annotation type were
identified as PHI. For example, among all IDs, 83.96% of them were
identified as a PHI of some annotation type.
However, a token level evaluation would be problematic if the
frequencies of tokens in the data set are not similar. For example,
consider a data set with 1000 documents. All 1000 documents have
a first name, and only 10 have a last name. The de-identification
tool detected the first names in 999 of the 1000 documents and
only 2 of the last names. If we pool both names as suggested above
the recall would be 1001/1010 = 0.99. This, however completely
hides the very low recall on last names because of the extreme
imbalance in the frequency of occurrence of each name. Therefore,
the concept of masking recall is only appropriate if the frequencies
of all of the direct and quasi-identifiers is more-or-less the same in
the data set. In practice this cannot be ensured and therefore we
need a more robust approach for evaluation.2.3.3. One or more leaks of direct identifiers
As noted earlier, for direct identifiers we assumed that a leak of
a single value in a document would result in the patient being re-
identified. To be precise we are concerned about at least one of the
direct identifiers leaking from the de-identification process. We
also need to evaluate this in a manner that accounts for the differ-
ent frequencies of different types of identifiers. Let si be the num-
ber of documents that a particular identifier i appears in, and n the
total number of documents. Then we can define the probability
that a direct identifier is missed or leaks given that it actually
appears in the corpus being evaluated as:Table 3
Comparison of masking recall and conventional recall on i2b2 data.
ID Names Organizations All
Quasi-identifiers
Masking recall 0.8396 0.7909 0.4517 0.847
Conventional recall 0.7796 0.7892 0. 3820 0.1649Prðleak; appearsÞ ¼ PrðleakjappearsÞ  PrðappearsÞ: ð9Þ
Which gives the probability that a leak will occur given that the
identifier actually appears in the data. The probability that direct
identifier i leaks and appears in a document is given by:
wið1 riÞ; ð10Þ
where wi ¼ si=n and ri is the all-or-nothing recall. The probability
that a document will leak at least one direct identifier is therefore
given by:
1
Y
i
ð1wið1 riÞÞ ð11Þ
This gives us the combined probability of a leak for all direct iden-
tifiers. Since each direct identifier type is dealt with independently,
the frequency with which specific direct identifiers appear in the
data set will not affect this calculation directly (except when com-
puting the confidence intervals).
2.3.4. Quasi-identifier risk
For quasi-identifiers, a single value is not necessarily uniquely
identifying. However, there is evidence that, in a number of juris-
dictions, two quasi-identifiers such as the date of birth and the
ZIP or postal code, are unique across most of the population [11–
15]. For example, that uniqueness approaches 100% in Canada
and the Netherlands [11–13], and is closer to 63% in the US [14].
We therefore make the conservative assumption that at least two
quasi-identifiers must leak in the same document to re-identify a
patient.
Letm be the number of times, on average, that a quasi-identifier
value in a document is repeated (i.e., the average number of
instances per quasi-identifier value). Also, let rq be the micro-
average recall computed across all quasi-identifiers. Then the prob-
ability of at least one quasi-identifier instance being leaked would
be given by 1 ðrqÞm. This means that the more instances that a
quasi-identifier has in a document, the greater the likelihood that
there will be a leak.
Finally, let nq be the average number of distinct quasi-identifier
values per document. Since we do not know which two or more
quasi-identifiers will be leaked, we need to account for all combi-
nations of 2 or more leaks. This can be represented as a binomial
distribution with nq trials:
PrðX P 2Þ for X  Bðnq;1 ðrqÞmÞ ð12Þ
where Bða; bÞ is a binomial distribution with a trials and b probabil-
ity of success. This is a suitable distribution even when the popula-
tion is known to be finite. The values for m and nq are computed
from the data.
The expression in equation (12) assumes that the instances
for the same quasi-identifier are protected independently. In
practice, this is a conservative assumption since the ability to
detect one instance of a quasi-identifier could be quite similar
across all instances of that quasi-identifier in a document. For
example, the recall for a date of birth will be the same for all
instances of date of birth. A less conservative approach for mod-
eling of at least two quasi-identifiers leaking would then be
PrðX P 2Þ for X  Bðnq;1 rqÞ. We nevertheless err on the con-
servative side because the recall will also depend on the context
in which a quasi-identifier is used and how it is expressed, and
that will not necessarily always be the same across all instances.
For example, the name of a facility may be ‘‘The Ottawa Hospi-
tal”, ‘‘TOH”, and ‘‘the general hospital in Ottawa” and all of these
instances refer to the same quasi-identifier but will have
different recall values.
In the i2b2 data set the proportion of documents with at least
two leaked quasi-identifiers was 0.3704, and the probability as
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example that equation (12) sets an upper bound on the risk and
errs on the conservative side.
2.3.5. Re-synthesis recall
It is common practice to replace the elements in text that are
annotated by the de-identification tool as direct or quasi- identi-
fiers with fake values. These would be randomly generated values
that are substituted for the original values. Such a re-synthesis of
the original text ensures that the de-identified text looks realistic.
It has been shown that an adversary who attempts to re-
identify individuals from a re-synthesized document has difficulty
in determining which identifiers are re-synthesized ones versus
original ones that were missed by the de-identification tool
[16,17]. For example, if the de-identified text has the names
‘‘James” and ‘‘Alan” in the document, there will be uncertainty as
to which one of these is the real name of the patient. For this rea-
son, re-synthesis allows leaks to be hiding in plain sight.
The probability that a document will leak at least one direct
identifier that is recognized by an adversary, and therefore the
probability of re-identification, is given by:
Prðrecognize; leak; appearsÞ ¼ Prðrecognizejleak; appearsÞ
 PrðleakjappearsÞ
 PrðappearsÞ ð13Þ
Let h be the probability a leaked identifier value is successfully hid-
ing in plain sight, i.e., the probability that an adversary can correctly
determine whether an identifier is an original one that was leaked
versus one what was re-synthesized. The above formulation for
direct identifiers can be computed as:
1
Y
i
ð1 hwið1 riÞÞ ð14Þ
where ri is the all-or-nothing recall for direct identifiers. For quasi-
identifiers we have:
PrðX P 2Þ for X  Bðnq; hð1 ðrqÞmÞÞ ð15Þ
Based on previous experiments [16] a reasonable value can be com-
puted as h ¼ 0:1, which also errs on the more conservative side
given that some studies found that h ¼ 0 [17].
2.3.6. Strict recall
Equation (14) could result in quite small values of recall giving
seemingly acceptable levels of re-identification probability. For
example, if we use h ¼ 0:1 from [16], wi ¼ 1, and ri ¼ 0:4, then
the overall probability of re-identification with re-synthesis would
be 0.06, even though the value of ri is quite low. Furthermore, with
a low value for ri the density of identifiers that have leaked will be
high and it is not clear that the h value from these previous studies
would still hold. Therefore, we need to specify a minimal value for
the recall values in order to use the re-synthesis adjustment. This
adjusts the equations above for those recall values above 0.9, ver-
sus those below 0.9. For direct identifiers we have:
1
Y
fijriP0:9g
ð1 hwið1 riÞÞ
Y
fijri<0:9g
ð1wið1 riÞÞ ð16Þ
In this case we assumed that a high recall of 0.9 for direct identifiers
would be necessary for the published h value to hold. We use a
slightly lower cutoff value than is reported in the literature [16]
because the literature uses micro-average recall all the time rather
than all-or-nothing, and this will result in inflated recall values.
Therefore, the lower threshold is an attempt to adjust for that.
Note the impact of w, the probability a direct identifier appears
in a document, will have on the overall risk from direct identifiers.
On the one hand w < 1 will decrease risk, possibly even counteringfor the loss of the factor h ¼ 0:1 when recall is below 0.9; on the
other hand w will increase variance for recall (which depends on
si ¼ nwi). In order to justify the use of the factor h we need to
ensure it is significantly greater than or equal to 0.9 (see the dis-
cussion of confidence intervals in Section 2.3.8).
And for quasi-identifiers,
PrðX P 2 if rq P 0:7; or Y P 2 if rq < 0:7Þ
for
X  Bðnq;hð1 rmq ÞÞ;Y  Bðnq; ð1 ðrqÞmÞÞ; ð17Þ
where 0.7 is the minimum recall value. This is the value that we
have used in our analysis based on our subjective judgement and
what would be acceptable to the institution releasing the data in
our study, but it is a parameter that can be adjusted by the analyst.
2.3.7. Accounting for attempted attack
If a de-identified text document is going to be disclosed pub-
licly, then the results in equations (16) and (17) would be the cor-
rect ones to use. However, for non-public data releases it is
necessary to take into account the probability that an adversary
will actually attempt to re-identify an individual in the data set
[18]. Considering the probability of attempt is common disclosure
control practice for health data and has been included in recent
guidance and standards [19–22].
This can be modeled as follows for direct identifiers:
Prðreid; attempt; leak; appearsÞ
¼ Prðattemptjleak; appearsÞ
 1
Y
fijriP0:9g
ð1 hwið1 riÞÞ
Y
fijri<0:9g
ð1wið1 riÞÞ
 !
ð18Þ
And for quasi-identifiers:
Prðreid; attempt; leak; appearsÞ ¼ Prðattemptjleak; appearsÞ
 PrðX P 2 if rq P 0:7; or Y P 2 if rq < 0:7Þ
for
X  Bðnq;hð1 ðrqÞmÞÞ;Y  Bðnq; ð1 ðrqÞmÞÞ ð19Þ
A scheme based on subjective probability that has been in use for a
number of years to evaluate the probability of re-identification for
health data has been developed for computing a value for
Prðattemptj ) [8]. This uses checklists to evaluate the security and
privacy practices of the data recipient, the types of contractual con-
trols in place, and the motives and (technical and financial) capacity
of the data recipient to re-identify the data set.
2.3.8. Confidence intervals
In the literature it has been assumed thus far that the computed
recall value is an accurate point estimate, and typically no confi-
dence interval was computed for it. However, because during val-
idation studies the computed value is an estimate of recall, it is
important to report the confidence interval around that estimate
as well. That confidence interval will be affected by, for example,
the sample size of the corpus and the frequency of identifiers in
the data.
Therefore the recall can then be represented by a normal distri-
bution with the observed value as the mean and the estimate of the
variance would be rið1 riÞ=si. Similarly, the weight wi can then be
represented by a normal distribution with the observed value as
the mean and the estimate of the variance would be wið1wiÞ=n.
Because each identifier will have a different frequency in the
data, the computations of recall will have different accuracy, and
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example, a direct identifier that appears in 1000 documents will
have a recall value that is computed more accurately after
evaluation than a direct identifier that only appears in 10 docu-
ments. We therefore need to account for this uncertainty.
Document frequency and all-or-nothing recall can be treated as
proportion estimates; document frequency is the estimated pro-
portion of documents with a particular type of PHI and all-or-
nothing recall the estimated proportion of documents correctly
annotated. Proportion estimates follow a binomial distribution
since they are modeled as Bernoulli trials, however it is common
practice to approximate this with a normal distribution [23].
The value of PrðattemptÞ can also be represented as a triangular
distribution which is a common approach to represent uncertainty
with subjective probabilities [24,25]. The counts nq and m can be
represented as Poisson distributions given that there will be varia-
tion in their values across documents as well.
The variable weight and recall values can be represented as nor-
mal distributions denoted by Nða; bÞ, where a is the mean and b is
the standard deviation. The triangular distribution is given by
Triangða; b; cÞ where b is the most likely value and a and c the min-
imum and maximum values. Therefore, we can then formulate the
overall probability distribution for direct identifiers as follows:
Prðreid; attempt; leak; appearsÞ
¼ 1
Y
fijriP0:9g
ð1 hWið1 RiÞÞ
Y
fijri<0:9g
ð1Wið1 RiÞÞ
 !
 A
for
Wi  Nðwi;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
wið1wiÞ=n
p
Þ;Ri  Nðri;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rið1 riÞ=si
p
Þ;
A  Triangða; b; cÞ ð20Þ
And for quasi-identifiers:
Prðreid; attempt; leak; appearsÞ
¼ PrðX P 2 if rq P 0:7; or Y P 2 if rq < 0:7Þ  A
for
X  BðNq; hð1 ðRqÞMÞÞ;Y  BðNq; ð1 ðRqÞMÞÞ;
A  Triangða; b; cÞ
where
Rq  Nðrq;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rqð1 rqÞ=sq
q
Þ;Nq  PoisðnqÞ;M  PoisðmÞ
ð21Þ
The distribution of the terms in equations (20) and (21) can be com-
puted using a Monte Carlo simulation and the 95% confidence inter-
val for the overall probability of re-identification derived from that
empirical distribution [25].
2.3.9. Setting thresholds
In this section we discuss how to evaluate the re-identification
probability distribution by comparing it to an appropriate thresh-
old for each of the direct and quasi- identifiers.
2.3.9.1. Evaluating the distribution for direct identifiers. For direct
identifiers, we create a benchmark or threshold distribution and
compare the actual distribution obtained from this data with that
threshold distribution. This threshold distribution is derived from
existing practices in the literature. If the actual distribution does
not cover a risk greater than what is covered by the threshold dis-
tribution, then we have sufficient evidence to conclude that the
actual risk is the same as or lower than the threshold risk and is
therefore considered acceptably low. This is illustrated in panel
(a) of Fig. 1. In other words we need the upper confidence limit
of the actual distribution to be less than or equal to the upper con-
fidence limit of the threshold distribution. Otherwise we cannotconclude that the risk is lower than the threshold distribution, or
that the risk is acceptably low. As illustrated in panel (b) of
Fig. 1, the upper confidence limit of the actual distribution is
greater than the upper confidence limit of the benchmark distribu-
tion, and therefore we cannot conclude that the actual risk is less
than or equal to the benchmark distribution.
This can be thought of in terms of a null hypothesis, where the
actual risk is greater than the benchmark distribution. In panel (a)
we can reject this null hypothesis and conclude that the actual risk
is not greater than the threshold distribution, but in panel (b) there
is insufficient evidence to reject it and we therefore conclude that
the actual risk may be greater than the threshold distribution.
For the benchmark distribution we need to determine an
acceptable recall for direct identifiers that will result in a measure
of risk that is equivalent to existing standards. The authors in [26]
recommended that a recall of at least 0.95 would be acceptable for
direct identifiers. We have extended this criteria to all-or-nothing
recall, which is more conservative than these authors had intended
since they were referring to micro-average recall.
When constructing the benchmark distribution we assume that
w ¼ 1, the worst case in terms of risk in that it assumes that all of
the direct identifiers are present in each document. By examining
the literature review in Appendix A we see that the smallest data
set that was used to evaluate a rule-based de-identification tool or
the testing data set for a machine-learning based tool was 220 doc-
uments. We therefore assume that n ¼ 220 for the benchmark
distribution.
When we put these values into equation (20) we obtain a con-
servative benchmark probability distribution that reflects what has
been considered acceptable performance for the detection and
removal of direct identifiers. Note that if a particular data set has
n < 220 then this would result in an actual confidence interval that
is wider than the benchmark distribution, increasing the chance
that the actual risk may cover a risk that is greater than the bench-
mark distribution. Therefore, we do not set minimal data set sizes
for evaluations because that is already accounted for.
When w < 1 the overall risk from direct identifiers will
decrease, but this will also increase variability because recall
depends on si ¼ nwi. In this case the actual distribution may
cover a risk that is greater than the benchmark distribution, and
we would not conclude that the risk is acceptably low.
Now thatwehave a conservative benchmarkdistribution,we can
perform the comparisons illustrated in Fig. 1 to determine if the
actual distribution covers a risk greater than the benchmark, and
therefore decide if the actual re-identification risk is acceptable.
2.3.9.2. Evaluating the distribution for quasi-identifiers. Previous
work has suggested a fixed 85% recall threshold for quasi-
identifiers in the automated de-identification literature [27].
However, a fixed recall value for quasi-identifiers would be quite
inconsistent with how the re-identification risk from quasi-
identifiers in structured data sets are evaluated, as illustrated below.
The benchmark for acceptable probability of re-identification is
determined by a threshold computed from the sensitivity of the
data, the potential subjective and objective harm that can affect
a patient if there was an inappropriate disclosure of their data or
re-identification, and the extent to which the patient had con-
sented for their information to be used for the anticipated sec-
ondary purposes [8,28]. These are the same criteria that are used
to determine the acceptable probability of re-identification for
quasi-identifiers in structured data sets.
When considering these three criteria, there are some strong
precedents for choosing a probability value that is acceptable.
Historically, data custodians have used the ‘‘cell size of five” rule
as a threshold for deciding whether data has a low risk of
re-identification [29–44]. This rule has been applied originally to
Fig. 1. Illustration of comparing the benchmark with the actual distributions when (a) the actual risk is no worse that the acceptable risk defined by the benchmark
distribution and (b) the actual risk may be worse than the acceptable risk defined by the benchmark distribution.
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to individual-level data—therefore these two representations are in
effect the same thing. A minimum ‘‘cell size of five” rule would
translate into a maximum probability of re-identifying a single
record of 0.2. Some custodians use a cell size of 3 [45–49], which
is equivalent to a probability of re-identifying a single record of
0.33. For the public release of data a cell size of 11 has been used
in the US [50–54], and a cell size of 20 for public Canadian and
US patient data [55,56]. Cell sizes from 5 to 30 have been used
across the US to protect student’s personally identifying informa-
tion [57]. Other cell sizes such as 4 [58], 6 [59–62], 10 [63], 16
[63], and 20 [63] have been used in different scenarios within vary-
ing countries.
Once an appropriate value is determined from within this range
using the three criteria and the checklist and scoring scheme in [8],
we can derive the following inequality from equation (21):PrðX P 2 if rq P 0:7; or Y P 2 if rq < 0:7Þ  A 6 s
for
X  BðNq; hð1 ðRqÞMÞÞ;Y  BðNq; ð1 ðRqÞMÞÞ;
A  Triangða; b; cÞ
where
Rq  N rq;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rqð1 rqÞ=sq
q 
;Nq  PoisðnqÞ;M  PoisðmÞ
ð22Þand s is the threshold probability. If the inequality is met then the
risk of re-identification is considered acceptable. The upper confi-
dence limit of the 95% confidence interval needs to be below the
threshold value to be able to conclude that the risk is acceptably
small.2.3.10. Summary
The framework that we have presented above for calculating
the probability of re-identification from a de-identified text docu-
ment provides more precise modeling of the risks from an adver-
sary. They may result in higher probability calculations than
under existing approaches in some instances, or smaller values in
other instances. Nevertheless, they represent a more accurate
way to assess the probability of re-identification than current
approaches.
We have also presented techniques to account for the uncer-
tainty in the estimated values and comparing the computed risk
values to benchmarks or thresholds in a formal manner. This
would allow a precise determination of whether the actual proba-
bility of re-identification is acceptably small. These techniques
account for the corpus size that is used to perform the evaluations.
The notation used in formulating our framework is summarized
in Table 4. The application of the overall model in a hypothetical
context is described in Appendix C, which shows how the equa-
tions can be used in practice.3. Methods
3.1. Data set
Our purpose in the empirical application of the evaluation
framework is to illustrate its use on a real data set, and show
how to interpret the results. We applied the evaluation framework
to a data set from the University of Michigan Medical School. The
data comes in four groups, one is a random assortment of docu-
ments from the full collection of over 80 million, while the other
Table 4
Summary of notation.
Notation Definition
si The number of documents that a particular direct identifier i
appears in
ri The all-or-nothing recall for direct identifier i
n The number of documents
rq The micro-average recall computed across all quasi-identifiers
m The average number of times that a quasi-identifier value in a
document is repeated – the average number of instances per
quasi-identifier value
nq The average number of unique quasi-identifier values per
document
sq The number of documents that a quasi-identifier appears in. In
most cases this will be the same as n
h The HIPS factor
Table 5
Number of annotations in the evaluation corpus.
#Documents #Annotations
ID 105 438
Phone number 34 78
Street name 10 14
Names (first, last, middle) 118 1332
Dates 111 703
Organizations 50 110
Age 2 3
ZIP code 9 13
Country 2 3
State 32 47
City 43 78
Table 6
Summary of results that would be obtained by a more traditional micro-average recall
calculation (and the leak rate, which is one minus the recall).
Micro-average recall Probability of a leak
Direct identifiers 0.9758 0.0242
Quasi-identifiers 0.8757 0.1243
Fig. 2. The 95% confidence intervals for the probability of re-identification for direct
identifiers using our evaluation scheme.
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Social Work Notes, History and Physical Notes, and Progress Notes.
Each document is between 1 and 2 pages in length and has dif-
ferent emphasis that is evident in the content and organization of
the document. The random group allows us to analyze each stra-
tum against a general representation of the overall corpus.
There are 30 documents in each group for a total of 120 expert
annotated documents. The entire corpus was annotated by a single
expert, and subsequently reviewed by a second expert. Where
there was disagreement the two experts met and reached consen-
sus on the appropriate annotation to use.
3.2. De-identification
The de-identification was performed with the rule-based engine
that was described elsewhere [9], Ch. Free–Form Text. Because this
was a rule-based de-identification engine, no training data set was
required to construct a model before applying it. The de-
identification engine was applied ‘‘out-of-the-box” without modi-
fication or customization.
The set of direct and quasi- identifiers that were targeted for
extraction in these documents are consistent with those that are
typically used in the literature [1]. These include: ID’s, phone num-
bers, people names, email addresses, street addresses, organization
names, ZIP codes, ages, country, state, and city.
We will compare our risk assessment results with those that
would be obtained using a typical contemporary micro-average
evaluation of recall. This will illustrate the difference between
the proposed evaluation framework and the current baseline.
3.3. Risk thresholds
For the purposes of our case study, we will use a threshold
based on the commonly used ‘‘cell size of five” rule, which is equiv-
alent to a probability of re-identification of 0.2 for quasi-identifiers.
The upper confidence limit of the quasi-identifier confidence inter-
val needs to be below that value. In the case of direct identifiers the
data confidence interval is compared with the benchmark confi-
dence interval.
4. Results
4.1. Data summary
Table 5 contains information on the data element type (annota-
tion) frequency by document and the number of instances of anno-
tations found in the corpus. The table refers to particular
annotation sets: the gold standard which was expertly annotated
and reviewed. The ‘‘document” column indicates the number ofdocuments containing that annotation, while the ‘‘annotations”
column represents the number instances (individual annotations).4.2. Evaluation results
The evaluation results are split into two sets. First, the results
using a more traditional micro-average recall are shown in Table 6.
In the second set of results we show the 95% confidence inter-
vals for the probability of re-identification using our evaluation
framework. In this case we have a mean value for direct identifiers
of 0.0074 and a mean value for quasi-identifiers of 0.0022. The con-
fidence interval for the direct identifiers from the data, and com-
pared to the benchmark, is illustrated in Fig. 2. This shows that
the upper confidence limit for the re-identification risk from the
data is below the upper confidence limit of the benchmark distri-
bution, and therefore we can conclude that the risk of re-
identification for direct identifiers is acceptably small.
In Fig. 3 we show the 95% confidence interval for the quasi-
identifiers. The upper confidence limit is below the 0.2 threshold
that we are using in our example. Therefore we can conclude that
the risk of re-identification for quasi-identifiers is acceptably small.
The comparison of these two sets of results shows that the
numeric outcomes of the evaluation will be different, and that
our evaluation framework, because it takes context into account,
will often be less pessimistic about the real risks. Again, as noted
Fig. 3. The 95% confidence intervals for the probability of re-identification for
quasi-identifiers using our evaluation scheme.
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to see differences in the numerical values and the conclusions
about the risk of re-identification.5. Discussion
5.1. Summary
In this paper we have presented a new framework for evaluat-
ing the performance of free-form text de-identification tools that
accounts for the many subtleties and distributional variances that
one sees in real data sets. It attempts to correct for poorly dis-
tributed evaluation corpora, accounts for the data release context,
and avoids the often optimistic assumptions about re-
identification that are made using the more conventional evalua-
tion approach. This framework provides arguably a more realistic
estimate of the true probability of re-identification. The framework
was illustrated on a heterogeneous corpus of documents from the
University of Michigan medical school.
The application of this framework to the de-identification of
clinical reports from clinical trials, as required by the European
Medicines Agency, is described further in Appendix B.5.2. Limitations
Our framework does not consider the precision of the de-
identification tool used. Our focus has been on the risk of re-
identification only. However, in practice precision would need to
be considered as well when evaluating real de-identification sys-
tems. That we focused on recall and the risk of re-identification
is not intended to diminish the importance of considering preci-
sion when evaluating de-identification solutions.
Furthermore, in very rare diseases the risk of re-identification
may still be present with a single quasi-identifier. In future work,
we will consider the implications of disease frequency in the global
population and re-identification risks.Competing interests
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